Abstract An access control system is needed to ensure only authorized users can access a sensitive resource. We propose a secure access control based on a fully secure and fine grained ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme. The access control for a sensitive resource is ensured by encrypting it with encryption algorithm from the CP-ABE scheme parameterized by an access control policy. Furthermore, the proposed access control supports non-monotone type access control policy. The ciphertext only can be recovered by users whose attributes satisfy the access control policy. We also implement and measure the performance of our proposed access control. The results of experiments show that our proposed secure access control is feasible.
Introduction 1)
Security service which ensures prevention of unauthorized use of a resource and limiting the flow of information is access control [1] . There are 3 types access control model known so far: Traditionally, the attribute-based access control mechanism employs a trusted server that records user's attributes and resource's protection in a trusted network [2] . However, this traditional approach solely depends on the security of the trusted server. Once the trusted server compromised, then the access control mechanism was also compromised. In general, an ABAC mechanism usually deploys a symmetric and a public cryptographic schemes to reduce the role of a trusted server [3, 4] . However, any public cryptography schemes only support one-to-one relation between a secret key and a ciphertext which is not compliance with the nature of ABAC model. Moreover, such kind access control solutions still rely on a trusted server and a secure storage.
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a class of attribute-based encryption system which improved the expressibility of access structure in the ciphertext [5] . CP-ABE systems can be used to provide access control in distributed environments since it can express complex relation between sensitive resources and principals. In CP-ABE, a plaintext is encrypted with an access structure where the access structure can be expressed in a Boolean function such as: ("student" AND "computer-science") OR "professor". A principal can recover the ciphertext, only if its attributes satisfy the access structure. In this case, a principal with a set of attributes {"student","electronics"} can not recover the ciphertext, while a principal with a set of attributes {"professor"} can recover the plaintext.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate an ABAC system built on a fully-secure CP-ABE with non-monotonic access structures. The CP-ABE is used for protecting the sensitive resource which encrypted with a certain access policy. Meanwhile, the access structure is used for authorizing access policy between resources and principals. Our CP-ABE scheme can express non-monotonic access policy which is problematic in CP-ABE schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The non-monotonicity of our CP-ABE allows user to express the access policy with 4 logical gates: AND, OR, Threshold and NOT.
Furthermore, our CP-ABE scheme is proven under fully security CP-ABE definition by applying dual encryption framework [10] [11] . We also implement our ABAC system with pairing-based cryptography library [12] . We analyze the computation cost and the memory requirement of our ABAC system. We demonstrate that the cost of setup, key generation, encryption and decryption of our system are feasible.
2. Access Structure and CP-ABE
Access Structure
In a CP-ABE scheme, an access structure will be used in encryption algorithm to produce a ciphertext that parametrized by the given access structure. A non-monotonic access structure has more expressibility than a monotonic access structure.
CP-ABE schemes in [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] only allowed monotonic access structure. Whereas the recent CP-ABE can handle non-monotonic access structure [14] [15] [16] [17] . Table 1 summarizes the differences between monotonic access structures and non-monotonic access structures.
Monotonic access structures
Non-monotonic access structures 
Construction of the CP-ABE Scheme
We used a CP-ABE scheme which based on bilinear groups with composite order of 3 primes.
We used variant of subgroup membership problems in [9] to prove that the CP-ABE construction is secure. Let us define a group generator:
Where  is a composite number of 3 primes:   ,   and   ,  and   are (additive/multiplicative) cyclic groups with order of  , and     × →  is a bilinear map satisfying bilinearity and non-degenerate:
The (1) Selects ←  at random. The encryption algorithm does the following:
(1) Selects     ←  at random. 
Decryption Algorithm ⊥←    , where   is a secret key parameterized by a set of attributes  ,   is a ciphertext parametrized by an access structure, and  is an access structure related to a well-formed non-monotonic Boolean function     . The decryption does the following:
we have two cases:
then there must be   ∈  satisfying      , the decryption computes:
then the decryption computes: 
Correctness of the CP-ABE scheme
The decryption algorithm shows that our CP-ABE scheme satisfied correctness requirement.
Security of the CP-ABE Scheme
The proposed CP-ABE scheme is proven to be -Guess. The adversary outputs a guess ′ of . as illustrated in Figure 3 .
<Fig. 3> Encryption of a resource with an access policy.
Accessing Object
When a user wants to access a protected object   in a ciphertext   , the user must provide a secret key   parameterized by a set of (15) To recover   , Alice invokes:
4. Performance
Comparison
We compare our CP-ABE construction with other existing schemes in regards of monotonicity of the access structure, security of CP-ABE, space requirement (public parameters, secret key and ciphertext length) and computation cost (number of pairing pin decryption). From Table 2 , our CP-ABE scheme achieves full security CP-ABE definition and non-monotone access structure. Most of the existing schemes do not achieve these properties.
The size of public parameters  of ours is in linear function of  where  is maximum size of a set of attributes to parameterize a secret key.
While, others are in linear function of  (attribute space size). Therefore, our CP-ABE scheme supports large universe construction.
The size of a secret key and a cipher text in our CP-ABE depends on the choice of bilinear groups.
We denote  and    to represent the size of element in group  and   respectively in bits.
The size of a secret key of our CP-ABE    is in linear function of  (which is the same as others CP-ABE schemes except Cheung [15] ). The 
Implementation
We implement our proposed access control system in C language and compiled the implementation with GNU C compiler. The program structure of our implementation is given by Figure   5 . , , , and .
<Fig. 5> Program structure of access control based on CP-ABE.
Experiment Results
We do some experiment to get actual time needed for the access control system executing 4 We found similar result for the cost of encryption. We found that the cost of decryption function is costlier than other functions as illustrated in Figure   9 . This is because the decryption function uses This shows the cost of key generation, encryption or decryption when  is 160, 256, and 512.
Conclusion
This paper proposed an access control system based on a CP-ABE scheme. We used a fully 
